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Abstract
In recent years, information systems have not been
largely evaluated by their operating costs, but mainly
by their strategic benefit and competitive advantage.
As blockchain-based decentralized applications
become more commonplace, representing a shift
towards
fully
consumption-based
distributed
computing, a new mode of thinking is required of
developers, with meticulous attention to computational
resource efficiency.
This study improves on a blockchain application
designed for conducting microtransactions of
electricity in a nanogrid environment. By applying the
design science research methodology, we improve the
efficiency of the application’s smart contract by 11 %,
with further improvement opportunities identified.
Despite the results, we find the efficiency remains
inadequate for public Ethereum deployment.
From the optimization process, we extrapolate a set
of general guidelines for optimizing the efficiency of
Ethereum smart contracts in any application.

1. Introduction
Over the past decade, digital platforms have
transformed the provision of applications in digital
networks [11,33,39]. Traditionally, these platforms
have been built using centrally controlled system
architecture [1,4]. Recently, however, it has become
increasingly popular to provide applications via
decentralized blockchain smart contracts, governed by
algorithmic incentives [5,36]. As the computational
resources of these blockchain networks are allocated
and priced according to free market mechanics
[9,13,21,24], resource-efficiency and cost-optimization
are placed in the center of application development.
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The efficiency of information systems and business
computing applications has not received wide attention
in research lately. Ever since the 1980s, IT systems
have not been mainly evaluated by their operating
costs, but rather by their enhanced market access,
product differentiation, strategic benefit and
competitive advantage [20]. The systems have been
largely perceived as investments with long-term effects
and benefits [34], across their whole lifecycle [37] and
most often emphasizing infrastructures, human
resources and IT-enabled intangibles [2].
The advent of grid and cloud computing has
gradually changed this long-term investment-based
view to a short-term utility-based one. This change has
produced some novel theoretical models on prices,
revenues, and resource utilization [3,26]. Also, more
general considerations on the new economic models of
cloud computing [6] and grid computing [7] have been
published.
As blockchain technology moves computing as
utility even further, a new mode of thinking is required
of software developers, with meticulous attention to
computational efficiency. While some theoretical
research has focused on embedded costs [15] and
institutional changes [12] of blockchain, so far there
has been little in the way of formal research into the
optimization of blockchain-based smart contracts.
In the absence of a centralized authority,
blockchain networks can consume vast amounts of
electricity to maintain consensus [21]. The Ethereum
smart contract platform, for example, has been
estimated to consume more electricity than the country
of Iceland, constituting approximately 1/1000th of the
world’s electricity consumption in total [14].
Advancing the understanding and developing best
practices in the optimization of blockchain-based smart
contracts is important to ensure that the maximum
innovation output and utility is achieved in return for
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the vast energy consumption of such systems and their
strain on the environment at large [27].
The objective of this paper is to improve and
analyze the feasibility of an experimental distributed
blockchain market application designed for conducting
microtransactions of electricity in a nanogrid
environment [19,23]. The paper applies the design
science research methodology by Peffers et al. [29] to
explore novel ways to improve the efficiency of the
application’s smart contract and to reduce its operating
costs in the Ethereum network. During this process, we
introduce a new set of general guidelines for
optimizing the efficiency of Ethereum-based smart
contracts.
By implementing two of the identified
improvement opportunities, we benchmark the
efficiency of the smart contract improved by 11 %.
While not adequate for economic feasibility on the
public Ethereum blockchain, we establish that further
improvements are likely to be possible with more
radical reformations to the source code, redefined
market mechanics, and the use of an alternative
deployment environment. Overall, the study
demonstrates that decentralized applications should
implement their own functional layers on top of the
smart contract, keeping the contract as simple and as
low in resource consumption as possible.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides a background for the paper by explaining
some of the core technological concepts. Section 3
describes the blockchain electricity market smart
contract analyzed and improved in this paper. Section 4
documents the process of optimization conducted in
this study, starting with the problem identification and
ending with the evaluation of the outcome. Section 5
contains some discussion on the findings. Finally,
Section 6 presents the conclusions.

2. Technological descriptions
2.1 Blockchain technology
Blockchain technology enables the creation of
decentralized, distributed and replicated digital ledgers.
The technology itself consists of components such as
peer-to-peer networking, public-key cryptography,
digital tokens, a decentralized consensus algorithm and
a tamper-resistant chain of blocks used to store
database modifications [28,32]. Originally, the term
was used solely in reference to the cryptographically
concatenated data structure employed by blockchain
systems such as the Bitcoin cryptocurrency network.
Later on, however, the term has taken the broader

meaning of the technological composition behind such
systems at large, in various configurations [25].
While cumbersome and often more expensive to
operate than centralized systems, blockchain networks
can be useful due to their tamper-resistant and nonhierarchical quality. Built on public open-source
protocols, they can also help foster the growth of
digital ecosystems with a bottom-up approach different
from conventional centralized platforms. For this
reason, cryptocurrency is an essential component of
any permissionless blockchain. It can be used to
facilitate economic incentives for the pseudonymous
participants in the network to collaborate with one
another and to maintain the integrity of the shared
blockchain database [11,21,24].

2.2 Smart contracts
Blockchain technology has enabled the creation of
decentralized execution environments for smart
contracts. In comparison to conventional digital
contracts, blockchain-enabled smart contracts expand
the digital contracting space by enabling tamper-proof
storage and decentralized algorithmic execution [10].
Moreover, diverging from contracts concluded in the
form of action, speech or writing, a smart contract is
characteristically a computer program built in code [5].
The concept of a smart contract is best explained
by an example. A vending machine takes coins and a
push of a button as inputs and dispenses change and a
product as outputs. The vending machine always acts
deterministically according to the same set of
instructions. Inserting coins into a machine is seen as a
sign of agreement with the terms of the vending
machine's embedded contract. The vending machine is
able to autonomously manage the process of handling a
customer's money and selling a product without an
external adjudicator [31]. Much in the same way as
vending machines, digital smart contracts can
essentially be characterized as cryptographic “boxes”
containing value that only unlocks upon the fulfilment
of the preconditions determined in their design [5].
Thus, they are able to handle the fulfillment of the
contractual clauses embedded in their software without
human intervention. Furthermore, they are able to
penalize breaches of contract and prevent any
unauthorized changes to their code [22,31].
For this paper, we define smart contracts as digital
programs that: a) are written in computer code and
formulated using programming languages, b) are
collectively stored, executed and enforced by a
distributed blockchain network, c) can receive, store,
and transfer digital assets of value, and d) can execute
with varying outcomes according to their specified
internal logic [22].
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2.3 Ethereum
In recent years, blockchain technology has helped
in overcoming the obstacles smart contracts previously
faced. One such milestone was the launching of the
decentralized application platform Ethereum in 2015. It
offers a Turing-complete programming language for
writing smart contracts and allows the deployment of
smart contracts into its blockchain [5].
Ethereum smart contracts can serve as a back-end
for decentralized applications. The benefits of using an
Ethereum smart contract instead of a new blockchain
include faster and easier development, bootstrapped
security, and being able to communicate with other
decentralized applications deployed in the Ethereum
blockchain [5].
Ethereum utilizes a transaction fee system to
prevent denial-of-service attacks and to incentivize
efficient smart contract deployment. A transaction
fee—or gas consumption—is determined by the
amount of computational work, network bandwidth
and storage space the transaction consumes [5]. This
type of a fee system, instead of a simpler model, such
as the one in Bitcoin, is required due to the Turingcomplete programming language in which Ethereum
smart contracts are implemented. The fee system must
be able to charge on a per computational step basis in
order to avoid the execution of infinite loops with
infinite resource expenditure.
The contracts’ code is run on Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) to ensure that the execution
environment is always identical and hardwareindependent. Every operation executed in the EVM is
executed on every full Ethereum node, as nodes must
validate new blocks before appending the blockchain.

3. A blockchain-based electricity market
application
This section describes the Ethereum smart contract
of the blockchain electricity market application
analyzed in Section 4. The application provides a
decentralized marketplace where nanogrid participants
can sell excess electricity to one another. Since the
marketplace is implemented as an Ethereum smart
contract, it has no need for a central authority that
could censor offers, steal users' deposits, or do frontrunning. In addition to providing a platform for making
contracts and trading electricity, the application also
inherently facilitates payment processing, using
Ethereum's native cryptocurrency, ether.
For a smart contract to be useful for energy trading,
a system composing of the following components is
required: 1) a smart contract facilitating the

marketplace; 2) a small-scale electrical network for
delivering electricity (i.e. a nanogrid); 3) smart meters
serving as access points to the nanogrid; and 4) a
reputation system for assessing the trustworthiness of
smart meters. However, in this paper, we do not
specify the non-software components or the reputation
system involved.

3.1 Electricity markets today and in the future
Due to the non-storable nature of electricity, supply
and consumption must be constantly balanced in
electrical grids. With multiple producers and
consumers interacting with the grid, determining the
price for each instance where supply and demand meet
is vital for grid balancing. In most developed markets,
price formation occurs at power exchanges, such as
Nord Pool, where a range of power delivery contracts
are used to balance the supply and the demand [35].
In EU countries, the percentage-share of renewable
energy in gross final energy consumption has risen
from 9 percent to 16.7 percent in a ten-year time span
between 2005 and 2015 [16]. Solar photovoltaic
generation and many other renewable systems allow
distributed generation near the points of demand,
reducing transmission losses [38]. Such localized
power production could transform the current vertical,
centralized energy system into a more horizontal and
distributed one. Conventional power generation, such
as coal-fired power plants, allow power output to be
steered to better match electricity demand. Therefore,
given the price inelasticity on the demand side, grid
balancing has traditionally taken place at the supply
side [8]. However, with the growing share of
intermittent renewable energy sources, future energy
systems may require demand-side flexibility. Real-time
pricing has been shown to affect demand and can be
used to reduce curtailment [17].
With photovoltaic systems and wind energy
systems becoming accessible and affordable, energy
generation may shift from large energy companies to
smaller organizations or consumers themselves. This
could spur the rise of small-scale electrical networks,
microgrids and nanogrids, that can be isolated from the
main grid thanks to local generation, consumption and
control. In such circumstances, a distributed market
mechanism would be beneficial for nanogrid balancing
and enabling interconnectivity between separate
nanogrids.

3.2 The process of transacting electricity
In the smart contract’s logic, the process of an
electricity transaction unfolds as follows (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. A flowchart of the process of trading electricity in the marketplace facilitated by the
smart contract. Each actor's actions are presented in a column of their own.
First, a user wishing to sell electricity makes a
transaction into a smart contract situated in the
blockchain, constituting a selling offer and specifying
the terms of a proposed agreement. Any other user
wishing to accept the offer and its terms may do so by
submitting a prepayment for the purchase into the
smart contract, thus expressing their intent to enter into
a contract. The prepayment, at this stage, is not yet
transmitted to the seller, but rather held by the smart
contract facilitating the trade. This way, it would be
unwise for the buyer to back out of the trade, already
having irrevocably committed to making the payment.
The seller, however, may fail to provide enough
electricity, thus breaching the contract. Thus, a
reputation system, that can penalize economically, is
needed to prevent producers from doing so.
In the smart contract facilitating the transaction,
two timestamps are specified: one for the starting time
of the electricity transfer and one for the end of it.
When the starting time occurs, the seller's and the
buyer's smart meters allow the buyer and the seller to
access the nanogrid and to transfer electricity. The
smart meters act as gatekeepers for the nanogrid,
preventing unauthorized electricity consumption or
overload from occurring. The smart meters also record
electric current and voltage during transmission, and
using that data, they are able to tell whether the
electricity transfer was successful.
After the time period allocated for electricity
transfer is over, the two smart meters autonomously
create blockchain transactions, reporting on the
successfulness of the electricity transfer on their
owner's side. Based on the reports, the smart contract

decides who can withdraw the prepayment made
earlier by the buyer. The desirable outcome is that both
reports implicate a successful trade, and the seller may
withdraw the payment.
Sellers can populate the electricity market smart
contract with multiple offers and buyers can accept any
offer that suits them best. All offers and agreements are
processed fully transparently. As a result, a fair market
price should be discoverable by the users.

3.3 Nanogrid characteristics
The electricity market smart contract has no notion
of transmission costs or transfer losses in the electrical
grid. Therefore, it is only suited for a compact nanogrid
network where transmission costs of electricity are
small enough to render them irrelevant when
considering who to transact with. The electricity
market application examined in this report assumes a
fully interconnected nanogrid topology. In other words,
each access point is directly reachable from every other
point without having to proxy through another access
point. The nanogrid needs to have a commonly agreed
voltage and current type (alternating or direct current).
All participants of the nanogrid are connected to the
nanogrid via a smart meter. Furthermore, although
energy storing devices are not required from users, an
ample use of batteries is expected locally behind the
smart meters. To prevent outages in an interconnected
nanogrid, each individual electricity transmission must
happen exactly as planned. Throughout the timeframe
specified in the smart contract, the seller is required to
supply the network with the specified amount of
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power. In a parallel circuit, however, the lack of a
consumption load on the buyer’s side is non-critical.

3.4 Sale and purchase agreements
The contract includes the four specifiers necessary
for any electricity transfer contract: delivery period
(start and end time), recipient (seller’s smart meter’s
Ethereum address), size of the transfer (amount of
electricity), and price. An id field is also added,
containing a 256-bit unique identifier for the contract.
When a buyer accepts a seller's offer, the buyer’s
Ethereum address and their smart meter's Ethereum
address are added into the contract. Finally, when the
scheduled transmission of electricity is over, the
seller's and the buyer's smart meters report whether in
their view the transmission was successful or not.

3.5 Smart meters
Ethereum smart contracts only have access to data
stored in the Ethereum blockchain. For this purpose, a
smart meter is required for every user to act as an
oracle (i.e. a trusted data feed into the blockchain) and
to control the connection to the nanogrid. The smart
meters either need to run their own Ethereum nodes or
connect to an external trusted Ethereum node. For
creating transactions, they must have their own
Ethereum address and have access to their private key.
The owners are expected to top up their smart meter’s
account with ether to maintain their ability to pay
transaction fees.
Users of the electricity market application should
not have full control of their smart meter, the software
installed on it, or the private key of the smart meter's
Ethereum address. Users should also not be able to
bypass the smart meter and draw electricity directly
from the nanogrid, as this would allow them to steal
electricity and to manipulate results of the smart meter
reports. Therefore, smart meters should be issued by a
trusted party, presumably a company that manufactures
or installs the smart meters.

3.6 Smart contract
The electricity market application involves two
smart contracts written in the Solidity programming
language. The SmartMeters.sol contract contains
a mapping of smart meter addresses and their owners
which the ElectricityMarket.sol contract is
able to look up. In the ElectricityMarket.sol
contract, there are five public, state changing functions:
1) makeOffer, used to signal the willingness to sell

electricity; 2) acceptOffer, used to accept standing
offers; 3) buyerReport and 4) sellerReport,
used by the smart meters to report the successfulness of
a transaction into the blockchain; and 5) withdraw,
used to withdraw the deposit of a specified offer.

3.7 Scalability
A successful trade in the electricity market smart
contract requires five Ethereum transactions,
consuming a total of over 400 000 gas. According to
the website etherscan.io, on the 12th of June 2018, the
average gas limit per block in the public Ethereum
chain was 7 996 828 and the average block time was
14.68 seconds. As a point of comparison, on the 13th of
October 2017, the gas limit was 6 712 392 and the
block time 31 seconds.
Were the public Ethereum chain to exclusively
process transactions that call functions of the electricity
market smart contract, the blockchain would be able to
handle roughly one trade per second. A throughput like
this is easily enough for a single community's
nanogrid. However, it is not enough for widespread
adoption of the application, processing trades of
multiple nanogrids along with the transactions of all
the other smart contracts on the public Ethereum chain.
Some method of increasing the scalability of the
system is clearly needed. Either the application needs a
significant reduction in gas consumption, or it needs to
be executed in an environment other than the public
Ethereum blockchain.

4. Applying the design science research
methodology
In this section, design science research
methodology by Peffers et al. [29] is applied to the
electricity market smart contract. Design science is a
suitable research approach when an innovative,
purposeful artifact is created and evaluated for a
special problem domain [18]. In our study, we built an
artifact and evaluated it to ensure its utility for the
problem. By using the design, we demonstrate why the
general blockchain solution must be improved in this
particular problem domain. We selected design science
as our methodology because it offers a rigorous
method for designing, building and evaluating the
artifact.
The methodology consists of a process model
involving six activities: 1) problem identification and
motivation, 2) defining the objectives for a solution,
3) design
and
development,
4) demonstration,
5) evaluation,
and
6) communication.
Since
communication, as described by Peffers et al. [29],
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encompasses the entire research article, we will
address activities 1–5 in this section.

4.1 Problem identification and motivation
In any public blockchain, a system of transaction
fees is needed to arrange transaction priority, to
prevent denial-of-service attacks, and to create an
incentive for running the network and maintaining its
consensus.
To complete a successful trade in the electricity
market, the seller needs to spend roughly 290 000 gas
on three transactions (calling the functions
makeOffer, sellerReport and withdraw) and
the buyer roughly 110 000 gas (calling the functions
acceptOffer and buyerReport). From 13th of
October 2017 to 28th of August 2018, according to
etherscan.io, the transaction cost of a trade to the seller
varied between $1.07 and $23.45 (USD), and to the
buyer between $0.41 and $8.90, depending on the
fluctuations of the gas price and the ether price during
the observed time interval (see Table 1).
Table 1. The cost of completing a trade in the
electricity market at various points in time.
Date
13 Oct 2017
14 Jan 2018
15 Feb 2018
12 Jun 2018
28 Aug 2018

Gas
price
(Gwei)
26.49
58.39
21.57
14.04
12.80

Ether
price
(USD)
$302.89
$1385.02
$920.11
$531.15
$288.02

Total
cost
(USD)
$3.21
$32.35
$7.94
$2.98
$1.48

The cost of performing a trade sets a lower bound
for the amounts of electricity that can be transmitted
and thereby limits the possible uses of the application.
For instance, it can never be profitable to sell
electricity for one dollar, if the seller needs to pay two
dollars in transaction fees.
Implementing an electricity market as a blockchain
application has several advantages compared to a
centralized service but these advantages can be
thwarted by high operating costs. The problem
identified in the electricity market smart contract is
that, at the estimated cost level, the public Ethereum
blockchain would not be a viable deployment
environment for the electricity market application.

4.2 The objectives for a solution
In Ethereum, transaction cost is simply gas price
multiplied by the amount of gas consumed by the
transaction [36]. To reduce transaction costs, at least

one of these two values should be lowered. Gas price
should generally not be controlled by Ethereum smart
contracts, but instead selected by the user at the time of
creating a transaction. This allows users to maintain the
ability to choose between cheap transactions and
getting their transaction included in the blockchain
quickly. The amount of gas consumed, on the other
hand, is a variable that can and should be optimized by
smart contract developers. Ethereum's transaction fee
system is built with the idea, that any use of
computational, bandwidth or storage resources costs
gas. Thus, making the contract less resource-intensive
in any of these aspects will also reduce its gas
consumption, therefore marking our objective.

4.3 Design and development
Trying to find inefficiencies in the smart contract's
gas consumption, we approached each of the contract's
five public functions individually. We first considered
if there was a viable way of executing the function offchain. If not, we examined if another method of
improvement would be applicable. During this process,
we identified and applied the following principles:
Avoid a design pattern where many new smart
contracts need to be deployed, for instance, on a peruser basis. At a cost of 32 000 gas, contract creation is
the most expensive EVM operation.
Keep the amount of transactions needed to interact
with the smart contract low to diminish the impact of
the transaction base fee of 21 000 gas. Design an
interface with fewer functions that do more actions,
rather than more functions that do fewer actions.
Optimize the smart contract's use of storage space.
Whenever possible, use memory instead of persistent
storage. Storing a word in persistent storage costs 20
000 gas, whereas storing a word in memory only costs
3 gas plus a memory expansion fee, whenever more
memory is required. The memory expansion fee scales
quadratically as more memory is needed, so memory
should be used densely.
When the use of persistent storage is necessary,
consider if the stored data could be replaced with its
cryptographic hash on-chain, and the data itself could
be stored off-chain.
Delete contracts and data stored in persistent
storage that are not needed, in order to gain gas
refunds.
Make use of off-chain transactions, using the
blockchain only as an arbiter in case disputes happen.
During the analysis, it was identified that the
makeOffer function can be removed from the smart
contract entirely. Instead of announcing sales offers in
the blockchain, offers can be cryptographically signed
by their creator and sent to potential buyers in an off-
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chain communications channel, e.g. a peer-to-peer
network. If a buyer later decides to accept the offer, the
buyer must then include the sales offer along with the
seller's digital signature as a parameter in their
acceptOffer function call. This way, unaccepted
offers do not needlessly bloat the blockchain yet a
buyer can prove the authenticity of the offer by its
digital signature.
The expected reduction in gas consumption from
implementing off-chain offers is approximately 21 000
gas per a successful trade. This is due to not having to
execute the makeOffer function anymore, and not
needing to pay its transaction base fee. In addition to
this saving, off-chain offers have the effect that offers
that are never accepted by a buyer also never create a
blockchain transaction, rendering them entirely free.
This can be expected to enhance the efficiency of the
electricity market due to much more efficient price
discovery and lower transaction costs.
The functions acceptOffer, buyerReport
and sellerReport do not seem as straightforward
to execute off-chain. An on-chain acceptOffer call
is necessary to make sure that only one buyer can
accept a given offer and to prove that the offer was
accepted before its expiration. The smart meter report
functions have a strict deadline before which they must
be submitted. An on-chain function call is a simple
way to prove that this deadline has been met.
The withdraw function needs to be executed onchain in order for the funds to be transferred on-chain.
It was identified, however, that the current design
where a separate call needs to be made for each
transfer of electricity is not optimal. If users were
allowed to withdraw funds from multiple electricity
transfer contracts using a single withdraw call, fewer
transactions would be required and less gas would be
spent on transaction base fees. With this modification,
we estimate the saving per electricity transaction to be
21000
21000 −
gas, where 21 000 is the Ethereum base
𝑛
transaction cost, and n is the number of trades from
which a user can withdraw funds using a single
withdraw call.

4.4 Demonstration
During the design and implementation work, three
artifacts were produced. Each artifact is a variant of the
electricity market smart contract with some attempted
improvements implemented. Artifact 1 implemented
off-chain offers, as discussed earlier in Section 4.3. In
Artifact 2, the withdraw function was modified so
that it takes an array of trade IDs as argument and
attempts to withdraw funds from all of the listed trades.

Artifact 3 combines the changes implemented in
Artifacts 1 and 2, with both off-chain offers and an
improved withdraw function implemented.
A benchmark use case was executed on the
artifacts, measuring the respective gas consumptions
(see Tables 3–5). The same benchmark use case was
also executed on the original electricity market smart
contract, to be used as a reference (see Table 2). The
benchmark use case was crafted so that it represents
typical use of the smart contract where a number of
trades are completed successfully: 1) as a seller, create
n number of offers; 2) as a buyer, accept all created
offers; 3) as the seller's smart meter, report all trades to
have been successful; 4) as the buyer's smart meter,
report all trades to have been successful; and
5) withdraw all deposits to the seller's address.
The variable n in step one translates to the number
of electricity trades completed in the use case. The test
case was executed with different values of n to see how
different implementations perform when varying
amounts of transactions are created.
We measured the combined gas consumption of all
the transactions created in the execution of the use
case. The gas consumption of the transactions was
inquired from the TestRPC instance using the
eth_estimateGas function of the Ethereum JSON
RPC API before the sending of each transaction. This
function makes a transaction and returns its gas
consumption but does not add the transaction to the
blockchain. In a TestRPC configuration like the one
used, the eth_estimateGas call is made to a
blockchain of exactly the same state as its
corresponding actual transaction, so the returned gas
consumption estimate is equal to the true consumption.
The measurements were run on an Ubuntu 16.04.3
LTS machine. The Solidity smart contracts were
compiled using the Solidity compiler solc version
0.4.18. A local instance of TestRPC version 6.0.1 was
used to simulate an Ethereum blockchain. TestRPC
was configured to create a separate new block for each
transaction. A block gas limit of 90 000 000 was
configured.

4.5 Evaluation
The results collected from the first artifact show
that the implementation of off-chain offers did reduce
gas consumption of the smart contract in the selected
use case. In measurements where a few trades were
made, roughly a 5 percent decrease in gas consumption
was achieved. When more trades were made, this
percentage gradually decreased. That is, however, due
to the smart contract becoming more populated with
data and certain phases in its execution having to spend
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Table 2. Reference measurements from the
original electricity market smart contract.
Amount
of trades
(n)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
16
32
64
128

Gas consumed
400 318
787 210
1 175 676
1 565 716
1 957 330
2 350 518
2 745 280
3 141 616
6 368 968
13 125 496
27 848 152
62 128 792

Table 4. Measurements from Artifact 2 that
implements the renewed withdraw function.
Amount
of trades
(n)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
16
32
64
128

Gas consumed
402 564
762 007
1 123 024
1 485 615
1 849 780
2 215 519
2 582 832
2 951 719
5 959 480
12 276 826
26 121 121
58 645 051

Difference
to reference
(%)
+0.56
-3.20
-4.48
-5.12
-5.49
-5.74
-5.92
-6.04
-6.43
-6.47
-6.20
-5.61

Difference
to reference
(gas)
2246
-12602
-17551
-20025
-21510
-22500
-23207
-23737
-25593
-26521
-26985
-27217

gas on iterating that data. The absolute gas
consumption savings achieved from off-chain offers do
not seem to be reliant on the number of trades made,
ranging narrowly from 20 784 to 20 816 gas per trade.
This roughly equals to the base transaction fee of 21
000 gas, which was the expected saving from not
having to call the makeOffer function
Implementing the ability to withdraw funds from
multiple trades using a single transaction also led to
savings in gas consumption, at best by over 6 percent.
Surprisingly, with all n values other than 1, Artifact 2
created larger savings than the initially estimated
21 000
21 000 −
gas per electricity transaction. With n
𝑛
values greater than 4, the savings of the artifact
exceeded the base transaction fee of 21 000 gas, which
was anticipated to be the maximum gas saving
opportunity for the artifact. We hypothesize that the
extra savings at least partly originate from Artifact 2
only calling the Solidity send function once, while the
reference implementation calls it n times. As a result,
slightly less EVM code needs to be executed.

Table 3. Measurements from Artifact 1 that has
off-chain offers implemented.
Amount
of trades
(n)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
16
32
64
128

Gas consumed
379 534
745 578
1 113 260
1 482 516
1 853 346
2 225 750
2 599 728
2 975 280
6 036 168
12 459 832
26 517 208
59 466 520

Difference
to reference
(%)
-5.19
-5.29
-5.31
-5.31
-5.31
-5.31
-5.30
-5.29
-5.23
-5.07
-4.78
-4.29

Difference
to reference
(gas)
-20784
-20816
-20805
-20800
-20797
-20795
-20793
-20792
-20800
-20802
-20796
-20799

Table 5. Measurements from Artifact 3, offchain offers and renewed withdraw function.
Amount
of trades
(n)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
16
32
64
128

Gas consumed
381 780
720 397
1 060 652
1 402 481
1 745 884
2 090 861
2 437 412
2 785 537
5 627 010
11 611 844
24 791 563
55 985 573

Difference
to reference
(%)
-4.63
-8.49
-9.78
-10.43
-10.80
-11.05
-11.21
-11.33
-11.65
-11.53
-10.98
-9.89

Difference
to reference
(gas)
-18538
-33407
-38341
-40809
-42289
-43276
-43981
-44510
-46372
-47302
-47759
-47994

Artifact 3 was a combination of the changes in
Artifacts 1 and 2: off-chain offers and the improved
withdraw function. It is noteworthy that the gas
consumption savings in Artifact 3 were almost exactly
equal to the sum of savings gained in Artifacts 1 and 2.
In other words, there was virtually no overlap in
combining the two improvements.
While we were able to reduce the gas consumption
of the electricity market smart contract in this study,
the reduction was a little over ten percent at best.
Assuming that the market participants are using
batteries to ensure their capability to make successful
trades, a typical trade in the electricity market could be
estimated to be in the same order of magnitude as the
capacity of a large car battery. A 12-volt 100 Ah
battery could theoretically output 1.2 kWh of
electricity. Assuming a price of $0.1/kWh, the
electricity transferred in a typical trade would be worth
$0.12. In section 4.1, we showed that at the market
prices over the past year or so, the total transaction cost
of a trade in the original smart contract, deployed in the
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public Ethereum blockchain, would have varied
between $1.48 and $32.35. Even with the gas savings
achieved, the transaction costs remain disproportionate,
and in fact orders of magnitude too high compared to
the value of a typical use of the application. This would
suggest that the implemented optimizations are not
adequate to make the application economically feasible
on the public Ethereum chain, at least for transactions
as small as suggested and at the examined price levels.

5. Discussion
While we were not able to improve the efficiency
of the electricity market smart contract to the point of
economic feasibility, this study demonstrates how
blockchain-based smart contracts require a new kind of
utility-centric focus on resource management in
software development. Any Ethereum smart contract in
any application should always seek to perform the
absolute minimum set of tasks required from it.
Whenever possible, decentralized applications should
implement their own functional layers on top of the
smart contract to keep the smart contract as simple and
as low in resource consumption as possible.
The guidelines we produced for optimizing gas
consumption of Ethereum smart contracts were
successfully applied to pinpoint and fix inefficiencies
in the electricity market smart contract. We estimate
that the drafted guidelines are perfectly applicable for
similar optimization tasks of any other Ethereum smart
contract as well.
Although we used price ranges based on the price
variation over the past year or so to estimate economic
feasibility, it should be acknowledged that due to the
chaotic nature of the system, future gas price dynamics
are difficult to predict. While deemed unlikely, any
radical drops in the real price of gas would require the
feasibility findings of this study to be re-evaluated.
While having little impact on gas consumption in
the benchmark use case, it was recognized that
implementing off-chain offers could enable new types
of price discovery mechanisms, potentially useful in
other contexts. In a use case involving heavy use of
selling offers that are never accepted, off-chain offers
alone could reduce gas consumption significantly more
than the 11 % measured.
It is also quite possible that other improvable
inefficiencies exist in the smart contract which were
simply not identified or pursued in this paper. For
example, a large share of the application's gas
consumption is due to the use of persistent storage. We
anticipate that significant gas savings could be
achieved by only storing the hash of a sales and
purchase agreement instead of its full details in the

blockchain. The actual data could be hosted elsewhere,
e.g. the Interplanetary File System (IPFS).
As an alternative to deployment in the public
Ethereum blockchain, the Plasma child blockchains
proposed by Poon and Buterin [30], for example, may
provide a viable platform for deployment in the future.
A Plasma child chain could provide a similar execution
environment connected to the Ethereum main chain,
but with a lower demand for transactions, implying
lower transaction costs. Another option would be to
create a separate Ethereum blockchain instance
entirely. While this would enable transactions at a mere
fraction of the cost of the canonical Ethereum chain—
or even completely free of transaction fees
altogether—the lack of support for the ether
cryptocurrency and for the security of the canonical
chain could turn out to be problematic.

6. Conclusions
In this study, we explored ways to analyze and
improve the feasibility of an experimental distributed
blockchain market application designed for conducting
microtransactions of electricity in a nanogrid
environment [19,23]. By applying the design science
research methodology by Peffers et al. [29], we
managed to pinpoint inefficiencies in the design of the
smart contract and to reduce its gas consumption by
11 %. From this process, we formulated a set of
general guidelines suitable for optimizing the
efficiency of any Ethereum-based smart contract.
While the improvement achieved in efficiency was
not adequate for economic feasibility on the public
Ethereum blockchain, we established that further
improvements are likely to be possible with more
radical reformations to the source code, redefined
market mechanics, and the use of an alternative
deployment environment.
Further research is encouraged on the recognized
improvement opportunities where additional efficiency
gains could be achieved. We also invite the exploration
of other new ways to improve the efficiency of
Ethereum-based smart contracts. Furthermore, the
price dynamics of gas and ether, and their effects on
application feasibility, would benefit from a more
structured delineation.
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